Published work

Taking motivating reasons’ deliberative role seriously. Philosophical Studies 182, 725–744 (2025). PDF

Work in progress (*draft available)

• Emotions and rationality

Hopeful suspension* (under review)

I argue that hoping entails suspending judgment. Hope as a form of suspension gives rise to coherence norms governing hope and other familiar states, such as beliefs and intentions.

The rationality of (false) hope*

I argue that hoping for an extremely unlikely outcome is not irrational as such. Rather, it is often a failure of resource and instrumental rationality. I discuss doctors' responsibility in managing patients' unlikely hope.

Hope, fear, and lotteries

I explore how a lottery ticket holder's affective states influence our judgments on what they believe and know.

A paper on our evaluative control over emotions

I argue that we have evaluative control over emotions, i.e., we can reason to and away from emotions. 

A paper on the relationship between hope and intentions

I argue that, if we can rationally hope and intend to φ, then the intention to φ cannot rationally require the belief that we will φ.

• Philosophy of psychiatry & medical ethics

A distressing consequence of clinically significant distress* (under review)

I argue that the clinical significance criterion in the current DSM leads to false positive diagnoses of mental disorders. Disorders targeting identity traits of social minorities are especially vulnerable to false positive diagnoses.

Rethink the harm condition for illnesses

A popular view of illness is that an illness must cause harm to the individual. I explore different causal relations between an illness and harm. 

• Metaphysics